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1. Introduction — the Alliance at Fifty
The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance was forged in October 1953, as
a result of the Korean War.  The United States was reluctant to conclude a bilateral
treaty alliance, but for South Korea, it was a matter of survival.  The alliance, it can be
said, was a product of tough diplomacy by the South Korean president Syngman Rhee.
Despite the origins of the alliance, the United States and the Republic of Korea have
strengthened their ties and the alliance has become one of the essential elements of
security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asia region.
The U.S.-ROK alliance today faces many challenges.  The global Cold War has
ended, but the last vestige of the Cold War era, the North Korean problem, remains on
the Korean Peninsula.  The renewed North Korean nuclear crisis since October 2002
has made the security situation more acute.  Furthermore, the September 11 terrorist
attacks on the United States in 2001 and the Iraq War of 2003 has brought upon the
world and alliances new tasks.  The United States seeks the “transformation” of alliance
relations in the new security environment. 2) Countering terrorism, non-proliferation
and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased its importance on
the global security agenda.  Upon the United States’ request, the ROK has dispatched its
forces to Iraq since April 2003, though not without controversy.  Domestic consensus
in South Korea has also been changing.  The death of two schoolgirls in an accident
involving an United States Forces in Korea (USFK) armored vehicle in June 2002
triggered anti-American sentiment, especially among the younger generation.  The
accident also led to the election of the liberal Millenium Democratic Party candidate
Roh Moo-hyun with a close margin of 2.3% against the conservative Grand National
Party candidate Lee Hoe-chang, as president in December 2002. 3)
Amidst the changing security environment, the U.S.-ROK alliance, in its fiftieth year,
embarked on a joint effort to transform the alliance with the “Future of the Alliance
Policy Initiative” (FOTA) since April 2003. 4) This includes the long-awaited realignment
of the USFK.  The two countries have agreed to relocate the United States 2nd Infantry
Division outside the Demilitarized Zone.  The 2nd Infantry Division is known for its
“tripwire” role that insured automatic commitment of U.S. forces to Korea in case of a
North Korean attack.  Also, in January 2004, the decision was made to completely
relocate Yongsan Headquarters to south of the Han River.  The relocation will take
some years, according to plan, but if it is successfully carried out, the foundations of a
new posture for the USFK and a new alliance will be established.
The present process is driven mainly by the Bush Administration’s post-9.11 global
defense posture review, that is, the “Rumsfeld Review” under the Department of
Defense (DoD). 5) It is also driven by political considerations — to deal with the surge
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of anti-American sentiment triggered by the death of the schoolgirls in June 2002.
Conservatives in the United States also countered with calls for withdrawal of the
USFK, when South Korean demonstrations occurred in late 2002, and the American
flag was torn apart.  It should also be understood, however, that the present FOTA
process is a culmination of a redefinition process of over ten years since the end of the
Cold War.  As a result of the process in the 1990s, it can be said that the U.S.-ROK
alliance has been redefined in its strategic objectives for the post-Cold War period, but
the process, in particular force realignment was not completed.  The post-9.11 Rumsfeld
Review and other political factors have provided a new strategic environment and
speeded up the process, often at a pace too fast for the South Korean side, but both
sides have managed so far to cope with the changes.  In this article, I will shed light on
the post-Cold War redefinition process, and then examine the present status of the
alliance and its future.
2. Post-Cold War Redefinition —the KIDA-RAND Study
Based on the 1989 Nunn-Warner Amendment (to the Fiscal Year 1990 United States
Defense Authorization Act), the DoD announced plans to reduce and realign forces in
the Asia-Pacific, as the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI ) in 1990 and 1992. 6) EASI
aimed to rationalize the military burden in accordance with the end of the Cold War
and to realize the “peace dividend” that the United States Congress demanded.  Under
EASI, USFK were to be reduced in phases, and its role would gradually shift from a
leading role to a supporting role in South Korean defense.  In the first phase, about
7,000 USFK personnel (mainly from Headquarters) pulled out in 1992, but the second
and third phases were suspended due to the emergence of the North Korean nuclear
issue in the early 1990s. 7) Deterrence and defense against the North Korean threat
remained the primary mission of the U.S.-ROK alliance.  However, if the North Korean
threat is reduced or disappears, the rationale of the alliance would become vague.  The
alliance would have gone adrift, if force reductions continued without adjustment of
alliance objectives in the changing post-Cold War security environment.  It is in this
context that the process of redefining the U.S.-ROK alliance was initiated. 8)
At the U.S.-ROK summit in July 1991, both sides agreed to continue relations toward
the 21st century even after unification.  The 23rd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative
Meeting (SCM) in November noted the importance of setting “the long-term course
for future security cooperation for the common interests of the two countries in the
Asia-Pacific region, looking toward the twenty-first century.” 9) At the 24th SCM in
October 1992, a joint study regarding the future of the alliance was recommended to
the Policy Review Subcommittee (in the SCM). 10) Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses (KIDA) (under the ROK Ministry of National Defense), and RAND
Corporation (U.S.) conducted the study from 1992 to 1994, and its results were
submitted to the 26th SCM in October 1994.  Receiving the report, United States
Secretary of Defense William Perry and the Republic of Korea Minister of Defense
Rhee Byoung-tae confirmed the “importance of maintaining a continuing security
relationship into the future,” and that “future study proposals will be developed for
consideration by the two governments.” 11)
The KIDA-RAND study, entitled “The ROK-US Security Cooperation Toward the
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21st Century,” recommended that the alliance must redefine its objectives if it is to
continue into the post-Cold War era. 
“The United States and the Republic of Korea recognized that close cooperation
rather than ‘going their own ways’ is necessary not only for improving the mutual
interests of the two countries, but also for securing the peace and stability of the
Northeast Asia region... the US and the Republic of Korea should redefine (italics
added) the roles and missions of the ROK-US alliance which was established to
defend against a Cold War regime.”
Furthermore, the future role of the U.S.-ROK alliance was posited as follows: “After the
North-South military confrontation ends, (the alliance) should supervise the peaceful
unification of the Korean peninsula, and in doing so, should contribute to peace and
security in Northeast Asia.  Also, the alliance should make a contribution to peace-
keeping activities of the United Nations and guarantee economic prosperity of the
countries in the Asia-Pacific region.  In addition the alliance should make a positive
contribution to the regional stability and the balance of power in connection with a
possible multilateral security cooperation in the region.” 12) The abridged version of
the joint study led by Young-koo Cha (KIDA) and Jonathan Pollack (RAND) was
published as A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security
Cooperation in late 1995, in which future options and recommendations for the alliance
were elaborated. 13) According to one of the co-authors, the study served as a conceptual
“foundation” for the redefinition of the alliance and played a “vital role” in the ensuing
process. 14)
According to the KIDA-RAND study and other related documents, such as ROK
Defense White Papers, the alliance during the Cold War was a “threat-oriented”
alliance in which countering and balancing against the North Korean threat was its
primary mission.  In the post-Cold War environment, countering the North Korean
threat would still be a primary objective, but the alliance should be adjusted according
to how inter-Korean relations develop and how the North Korean threat, and the
surrounding environment changes.  The KIDA-RAND study calls this a “situation-
driven long-term plan” in which the alliance should be adjusted “gradually” taking into
account, in particular inter-Korea relations. 15) If inter-Korean relations improve and
the North Korean threat is reduced, the alliance should change from a “threat-driven”
alliance to a (inter-Korea) “integration-driven” alliance, and furthermore, after Korean
unification, transform into a “profit-driven” alliance that would promote mutual
interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. 16)
As for responsibility-sharing or division of roles and missions, bilateral relations would
change from a patron-client relationship to a more mutually beneficial relationship or
“comprehensive strategic partnership” as the KIDA-RAND study called it.  In the
course of “gradual transition,” ROK would take the “leading role” in the defense of
Korea, with the United States playing a “supporting role,” but in regional defense and
security, the United States would play a “central role.” 17) This meant that in regional
security, South Korea would play a supporting role with other allies and partners such
as Japan, Australia, Southeast Asian countries. 18) The alliance vision can be summarized
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as follows. 19)
Chart 1  ROK-U.S. Alliance’s Vision for the 21st Century (1995)
Security Environment Division of Roles
(Inter-Korea relations)
→ Role Korea Defense Regional Defense
North-South Confrontation U.S.-led,
(North Korea military threat ROK support
Threat-driven remains) (Koreanization of
alliance → Deter North Korea threat Korea defense
Maintain stability in promoted)
Northeast Asia 
North-South peaceful coexistence Korea-led, U.S.-led,
(North Korea military threat U.S. support Korea support
Unification-driven substantially reduced, diminished) (Koreanization of (with other allies
(integration-driven) → Promote unification Korea defense and partners)
alliance Regional stability and prosperity completed)
in NE Asia, Asia-Pacific
Multilateral security cooperation
(UN PKO, etc.)
North-South unification Korea-led, U.S.-led,
Profit-driven → Security of Unified Korea U.S. support Korea support
alliance Regional stability and prosperity (with other allies
in NE Asia, Asia-Pacific and partners)
Multilateral security cooperation
In sum, the KIDA-RAND study recommended that the alliance change from a
“peninsular alliance” that would be focused on Korea defense to a “regional alliance”
that would be responsible not just for Korea, but for areas outside of Korea.  In that
new alliance the United States and ROK would take more mutually responsible roles,
and the ROK would increase its regional defense role. 20)
Although the recommendation was made to redefine the alliance, the North Korean
nuclear problem became the main concern in 1994–1995, so the redefinition process
became low-key.  The Nye Initiative froze the American force level in the Asia-Pacific
at approximately 100,000, and focused on the redefinition of the United States-Japan
alliance, which culminated in the 1996 United States-Japan Joint Security Declaration.
Unlike the U.S.-Japan process in which top leaders were actively engaged, the U.S.-
ROK redefinition process continued at the working-level.  The directions recommended
by the KIDA-RAND study were acknowledged in the public statements and policies of
the two countries in the latter-half of the 1990s.  For example, the DoD’s 1995 East Asia
Strategic Report (or “Nye Report”) mentioned that the U.S.-ROK alliance should continue
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for “the long-term,” implying the continuance of the relationship beyond the North
Korean threat and after unification. 21) President Kim Dae-jung supported the continued
presence of USFK even after unification, 22) and the United States acknowledged and
supported Kim’s statements in the 1998 DoD East Asia Strategic Report (EASR ).
The EASR basically confirmed the KIDA-RAND study objectives as follows: “The
U.S. military presence will continue to support stability both on the Korean Peninsula
and throughout the region after North Korea is no longer a threat.”  In addition, the
alliance and the USFK will “continue to contribute to the residual defense needs of
Korea and assist in the integration of the two Koreas as appropriate.”  Furthermore,
“after reconciliation, and ultimately, reunification, the United States and Korea will
remain deeply committed to mitigating regional sources of instability” in the Asia-
Pacific region, such as heavy concentrations of military force, unresolved territorial
disputes and historical tensions, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
means to deliver them.” 23)
In the annual SCM Joint Communiques the United States and the ROK also confirmed
that they will “continue to share democratic values and security interests even after
immediate threat to stability has receded (italics added)” and the alliance will serve to
“bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.” 24)
Discussion on the “long-term development” of the alliance were to be conducted
through “periodic working-level security dialogues” as agreed upon at the 31st SCM in
1999. 25) During 2000-2001, joint study was done on U.S.-ROK combined defense
postures and conditions for long-term presence of USFK, and a more detailed study
was scheduled from 2002 on the future of the alliance and USFK force posture. 26)
3. 9.11 and After: FOTA and Force Realignment
As examined above, it can be said that the U.S.-ROK alliance has already been
“redefined,” but not completely.  The rationale of the alliance has been changed to
“regional stability” including those beyond the North Korean threat, but the force
structure must be adapted to new objectives, if the redefinition is to be completed.  As
Victor Cha and Chaibong Hahm noted, although the United States and ROK
governments have publicly supported the continuation of the alliance and the USFK
even after reunification, making public political statements and implementing those
statements are a different different. 27)
Fundamental change was called for after the 9.11 terrorist attack on the United
States in 2001.  The death of the Korean schoolgirls in 2002 also promoted the process.
At the 34th SCM in December 2002, both sides agreed to start the “Future of the
Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA)” and engage in “policy-level discussions” to “develop
options for modernizing and strengthening the alliance.” 28) In light of the “redefinition”
process of the 1990s, the FOTA can be understood as the long-awaited opportunity to
finally complete the process — that is, to progress with the force realignment that had
been suspended for over a decade.
However, there are differences as well.  The 1990s process envisioned a “gradual”
transition, in accordance with changes in inter-Korea relations, but for the Bush
Administration, the post-9.11 global war against terrorism and post-Iraq War needs took
precedence over local conditions, i.e., inter-Korean relations.  The U.S. now desires a
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more rapid adjustment of the force structure, that is, a fundamental “transformation” in
line with the ongoing global military posture review.  Furthermore, integrating RMA
(Revolution in Military Affairs) technology, such as new long-range high precision
systems and intelligence collection systems, the United States now focuses on building
mobile, rapid-reaction forces that can be flexibly deployed. 29) Thus, the USFK, which
is a heavy, ground-based force of about 37,000 troops designated only for South Korea
becomes a major target of the global review.
In February 2003, in a comment to U.S. News and World Report, top aides to Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld contended that advances in military technology, along with the
improved capability of South Korea’s Army, make it possible to reduce United States
ground forces without jeopardizing South Korea’s security.  The United States would
emphasize Navy and Air Force long-range strike weapons, relying on South Korea to
bear a greater burden, including along the fortified DMZ.  A senior American defense
official said, “This is probably something we’ve neglected taking a hard look at for at
least 10 years.” 30)
Thus a new round of talks began. Preliminary meetings of the FOTA were held on
February 27-28, 2003, immediately after the inauguration of President Roh Moo-hyun
on Feburary 25.  The first official FOTA meeting was held in April 2003.  Unlike the
SCM, which is a defense meeting, the FOTA meetings have been held in a “2-plus-2”
format, similar to the U.S.-Japan security process, in which defense and diplomatic
officials participate.  Although defense officials take the primary role, the participation
of diplomatic officials indicate the “comprehensiveness” of the alliance review process. 31)
In the 1st FOTA meeting, both sides agreed on the following two points as basic
principles for the bilateral review: (1) the need to adapt the alliance to the new global
security environment and to take into account the ROK’s status as a prosperous
democracy; and (2) the need for both countries to invest in an enduring alliance.  This
meant that the role of the ROK forces in defense of the Korean peninsula would be
“expanded,” and U.S. forces’ contribution to “regional stability” would be “enhanced.” 32)
These principles were confirmed by top-level leaders and set the direction for the
FOTA process. At the summit in May 2003, Presidents George Bush and Roh agreed
to “modernize” the U.S.-ROK alliance and build a “more comprehensive and dynamic
alliance relationship for continued peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and
in Northeast Asia.” 33) In June, defense ministerial talks were held, and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense Cho Yung-kil took note of the FOTA
process and agreed to continue “enhancing, shaping and aligning” the alliance to meet
the “challenges of the 21st century security environment.” 34) In a speech in late May,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz emphasized the American commitment
to improve the U.S.-ROK alliance and to “sustain a strong alliance over the long run
by reducing unnecessary burdens on both sides” so to ensure that the alliance remain
“relevant into the future.” 35)
With the aim of modernizing and enhancing the alliance for the future, what kind of
force structure is envisaged?  After almost a year of FOTA consultations, the United
States and the ROK have worked out a basic blueprint, though there are still many
details to be worked out.  The FOTA aims to realign the USFK, and adjust and
enhance the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture in which the ROK will expand its
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role.  The American side has pushed for rapid change, while the ROK side desired a
more gradual change, considering the precarious situation surrounding the North
Korean nuclear problem and the financial and military costs it will have to bear for the
transition.  The ROK side has accepted the “realignment” of USFK, including the
relocation of United States 2nd Infantry Division, though reluctantly. 36) The U.S.
hoped to obtain an overall agreement of USFK relocation by the 35th SCM in autumn
2003, but agreement was not concluded by then, and talks continued. Nevertheless,
some progress has been made.
At the 2nd FOTA meeting in June 2003, both sides agreed to begin work on
implementation plans regarding the following: capability enhancement of the U.S.-
ROK combined defense, relocation of Yongsan Garrison, transfer of USFK military
missions to ROK Forces, and realignment of USFK. 37)
USFK Realignment and Base Consolidation: In March 2002, the United States
and the ROK had already agreed on the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), which envisaged
major reductions and realignment of bases in a span of about ten years. 38) FOTA
study integrates the LPP, but envisages an expanded version of the plan.  The LPP did
not include Yongsan Base relocation, a contentious issue, but in the FOTA, Yongsan
relocation was agreed upon.  Also, relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division out of the
DMZ, another contentious issue, was agreed upon. 
In the FOTA plan, the U.S. aims to integrate and consolidate the USFK base structure
into key hubs south of the Han River.  At the 2nd and 3rd FOTA meetings, a two-
phase relocation plan was announced.  In the first phase, American forces north of the
Han River, including the 2nd Infantry Division, will be consolidated into Camp Casey
(Tongdujo˘n) — Camp Red Cloud (U˘ijo˘ngbu) area north of the Han River.  Phase one
is scheduled to be implemented in 2004–2006, although political factors are likely to
delay the plans.  In the second phase, American forces north of the Han River would
move to key hubs south of the Han River, to be located in the Osan (American Air
Force Base) -P’yo˘ngtaek (Camp Humphreys) area.  The Taegu-Pusan area (including
Camp Hialeah) is considered to be another hub for contingency-response (including
prepositioning of wartime stockpiles).  However, no schedule is set for phase two.  This
phase includes the sensitive issue of 2nd Infantry Division relocation, and would be
pursued “taking careful account of the political, economic, and security situation on the
peninsula and in Northeast Asia,” as agreed upon at the Bush-Roh summit in May
2003.  It was also agreed to maintain a United States military rotational training presence
north of the Han River even after phase two is completed. 39)
Yongsan Relocation: Relocation of the Yongsan Garrison had been an issue for
over ten years. 40) The issue was revived by the Bush administration that desired early
relocation.  USFK Commander General Leon J. LaPorte proposed plans to redeploy
6,000 of the 7,000 personnel in Yongsan to the south of the Han River, and for some
1,000 personnel and the United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces
Command (CFC), USFK headquarters, would remain in Seoul. 41) But details over
land area could not be worked out, so agreement (due at the SCM in November 2003)
was postponed.  It was at the 6th FOTA meeting in January 2004, that agreement was
finally announced to completely relocate Yongsan Headquarters, including the UNC,
CFC, USFK command, south of the Han River by the “end of 2006.”  The ROK
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Government is to bear the financial cost of the relocation, estimated to be about US$3
billion.  Tasks remain, however, such as working out an overall agreement, obtaining
legislative approval and procuring land. 42)
Force Enhancement: Regarding the enhancement of the U.S.-ROK combined
forces, Commander General LaPorte announced a Force Enhancement Plan in late
May 2003.  This is a US$11 billion investment plan to improve CFC capabilities over
a three-year period in more than 150 items.  Near-term enhancements include upgrades
to intelligence collection systems, increased numbers of improved precision munitions,
rotational deployment of the United States Army’s newest Stryker unit to improve
responsiveness, and additions to the Army’s pre-positioned WRSA (War Reserve
Stock for Allies) to increase readiness.  Addition of PAC-3 units (upgraded system of
Patriot missiles), replacing old USFK helicopters with AH-64D Apache Longbow
multi-role helicopters, introduction of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits
(including guided smart bombs) are also in the plan. 43)
Transfer of DMZ Missions: The transfer of USFK missions to the ROK forces is a
measure which aims for ROK to eventually take full responsibility of the Demilitarized
Zone.  At the 3rd FOTA meeting in July, both sides agreed to completely transfer Joint
Security Area missions to the ROK Forces by the end of 2004 to 2005, but the measure
was postponed at the 4th meeting in September, due to caution on the ROK side.  The
ROK did not desire a rapid change of the “tripwire” role of the USFK in the area, but
they may take over missions at a later stage.  Transfer of key missions was discussed in
July, and the 35th SCM Joint Communique in November stated that “ten missions”
were to be transferred in the coming years. 44)
Command Relations: Adjustment of command relations is another issue.  The U.S.
and ROK forces cooperate under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) structure
(since 1978). 45) An American four-star general (who also heads the UNC and USFK) is
the CINCCFC (Commander-in-Chief of the CFC), and a South Korean four-star
general is Deputy Commander-in-Chief.  Operational control of the ROK forces are
held by the CINCCFC, but peacetime operational control has been returned to the
ROK in 1994.  The issue of wartime operational control remains.  In the FOTA, the
United States and the ROK agreed that the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) in South Korea
and the United States form a consultative group to conduct the study of ROK-US
combined command relations in the mid-to-long term, and report the results to the
SCM in 2005. 46)
Future Role of USFK: The future role of the USFK remains to be seen.  The present
FOTA focuses on USFK realignment and base consolidation in the context of Korean
defense, but not on new missions or size.  U.S. officials have commented on the
possibility of USFK “reduction,” but due to domestic concern in South Korea regarding
the withdrawal of USFK, especially from the conservatives, 47) the ROK government
and military has been cautious about comments on “reductions.” 48)
Both governments, especially the ROK side, has also been cautious about the
prospect of new “regional” roles for the USFK outside the Korean peninsula, since this
would be something completely new for the USFK and the alliance — one which
would require a clear “redefinition” of roles and building domestic consensus in South
Korea.  The present mission of the USFK is to deter and defend against a North Korean
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attack.  But what about roles beyond the North Korean threat, that is, a broader
regional role for the USFK?  Experts have considered the desirability of regionalizing the
USFK, that is, the deployment of USFK for missions outside the Korean peninsula. 49)
The present Bush Administration’s global military posture review has provided
momentum to this issue.
There has been speculation regarding the reduction of USFK. Although denied by the
American and South Korean governments, it has been reported by Associated Press
that the Bush Administration, according to some senior U.S. officials and experts,
desire to cut about one-third of the current level of 37,000 troops.  It is envisaged that a
lighter, realigned USFK, if successfully realized, could serve as a “expeditionary” force
that can be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. 50)
According to experts, the Pentagon’s new strategy for lighter, mobile forces in Asia
will focus on air and naval power, in which Japan and Guam would be the major hub
bases, and bases in South Korea would be lighter forward operating bases.  The United
States will increase its pre-positioned equipment at air and sea hubs in southern Korea,
so forces can be rapidly reinforced if conflict occurs. 51) The two heavy armored
brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division, an expert says, may be substituted with intelligent
brigades utilizing more high-precision weapons.  In this context, the expert notes that
combined deterrence against the North Korean threat will not be lessened but may
actually be enhanced even if troops are cut. 52)
Furthermore, a realigned USFK may also serve as a “regional force” for deployment
outside Korea, and it is implied in the FOTA process.  At the 1st FOTA meeting, the
United States and the ROK have stated that the “ROK-US alliance must be developed
in ways to best contribute to security on the Peninsula and beyond (italics added).
Accordingly, both parties agreed in principle to expand ROK forces’ role in defense of
the Peninsula and to enhance US forces’ contribution to regional stability (italics added).”  At
the 2nd meeting, the two sides confirmed that “both sides agreed on the importance of
structuring of U.S. forces in a manner that further promotes regional stability (italics added).” 53)
Also, at the 35th SCM, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense Cho
Yung-kil “reaffirmed the continuing importance of strategic flexibility (italics added) of
the USFK.” 54) These reflect the desires of the U.S. side for a broader regional role for
the USFK but at present, the ROK side is reluctant about discussing the issue, since
this would imply a completely new role for the alliance.  President Roh Moo-hyun has
said that “if USFK was acting as a deterrent to North Korea till now, from now on, it will
seek regional solidity as a new stabilizer in Northeast Asia,” expressing support for a
broader regional role for the USFK. 55) But what this exactly means is yet to be known.
It was reported in the media (though unconfirmed) that in the FOTA meetings, the
United States and the ROK discussed the idea of expanding USFK into a regional
defense force for Northeast Asia, which would include areas, for example, from Russia
to Taiwan. 56) Along the same line, an article on plans to realign the United States Pacific
Command ran in the media.  An American journalist, quoting American “military
officers,” noted that this revision is part of the Rumsfeld Review to make United States
forces in Asia more responsive to regional contingencies from “Korea to Australia.”  In
the plan, command elements in South Korea, including the UNC, USFK, CFC, EUSAK
(Eighth United States Army) are “most likely” to be dismantled, and the position of the
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four-star general who commands UNC, USFK and CFC, will be abolished.  The United
States Forces in Japan (USFJ) will also be dismantled, and a new operational corps
headquarters led by a three-star lieutenant general will be established.  The corps
headquarters in Japan will likely take operational control of the 2nd Infantry Division
and other Army combat formations in Korea to form one operational force, which
would focus less on ROK defense and more on deployments elsewhere in Asia.  Allied
governments in Asia, particularly Seoul and Tokyo will be consulted before final
decisions are made, but both allies have shown reluctance. 57) American military
authorities commented that this is not an official position, but it would certainly affect
the next stage of U.S.-ROK FOTA talks on command structures and the future
direction of USFK realignment. 58)
4. Conclusion — The U.S.-ROK Alliance as a “Regional Alliance”?
The U.S.-ROK alliance, now fifty years old, has embarked on a new round of
readjustment in an attempt to adapt the alliance to a new security environment.  The
post-Cold War “redefinition” process from a “peninsular” to a “regional alliance”
continues with new momentum in the post-9.11 environment under the Bush
Administration.  The new round of global consultations with United States allies since
December 2003 will further promote the realignment of the U.S.-ROK alliance in
conjunction with other regional alliances, especially the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The alliance is at a historical juncture.  “Is this the beginning of the reconfiguration of
the alliance?  Or is it the first step in the dismantling of the alliance?”  As Scott Snyder
of the Asia Foundation noted, there are still many unknowns. 59) In recent years, China
has deepened economic and diplomatic ties with South Korea, and the so-called 386
generation increased their voice in South Korea.  They are more “independent-minded,”
and some advocate, for example, a more neutral position between the United States
and China. 60) If left to its own forces, the alliance may certainly drift into irrelevance,
especially after the North Korean threat is gone.  But the path for reconfiguration is
also in the making.  If the FOTA process is implemented successfully, the U.S.-ROK
alliance will be able to build the foundation for a broader “regional alliance.”  Needless
to say, however, there are still many tasks ahead.
In order to progress with transformation of the alliance into a regional alliance,
regional security goals and missions needs to be defined If not, it would be impossible
for the redefinition to be completed.  As South Korean expert, Kim Sung-han of the
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security stresses, “If the nature of regional
security is defined vaguely under a mutual defense treaty, substantial confusion may
occur with Korea being expected to cooperate in various disputes.” 61) One major issue
in regional security would be how to deal with China.  For example, will the U.S.-
ROK alliance respond to a Taiwan Straits crisis?  The United States would desire that
option.  However, it would be problematic for South Korea.  While relations with the
United States are indeed very important, the ROK would also be reluctant to take
action that would aggravate its relations with China. 62) Another more immediate issue
is how to deal with North Korea, in new, more coercive venues such as the Bush
Administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  PSI is part of an American-led
global effort to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and North Korea is
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one major target.  Eleven members including Australia and Japan are participating in
interdiction exercises, but South Korea has not participated. 63)
Does the U.S.-ROK alliance have a future as a “regional alliance”?  If we go back to
the original goals of the alliance, regional security can be found.  In the preamble of
the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, both sides desired “further to strengthen
their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending
the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific
area (italics added).” 64) A “more comprehensive and effective system of regional
security in the Pacific area” is yet to be established.  Thereby, a major task remains for
the United States and the ROK in the 21st century.
Considering the United States and the ROK’s political and economic status, the
U.S.-ROK alliance would be an essential element of a regional security system in the
Asia-Pacific area.  The first Bush Administration, in the early 1990s successfully placed
South Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance in its “Pacific Community” concept based on
shared values such as democracy and market economy, and promoted EASI force
reductions. 65) The Clinton Administration proposed its own “Pacific Community” idea
and the DoD’s EASR posited the U.S.-ROK alliance as one of the important alliances
in the Asia-Pacific and called for enhancing and upgrading the alliances. 66) The present
Bush Administration has yet to elaborate an overall comprehensive strategy on the
Asia-Pacific security structure and alliances.  In this sense, a conscious effort by both
the United States and the ROK must be taken to maintain and adapt the alliance so
that it can contribute effectively in building a broader regional security structure.
More than ten years ago, when the redefinition process for the post-Cold War period
started, Cha Young-koo of KIDA outlined a possible scenario, the “Framework for the
ROK-U.S. Military Alliance in 2010.”  By 2010, he envisioned U.S.-ROK military
relations that has changed from a “tactical partnership” to deter a North Korean attack
to a “strategic partnership” to safeguard peace in Northeast Asia.  The alliance structure
will undergo fundamental changes as follows.
The U.S. ground force in South Korea reduced to a symbolic level (a few thousand),
but the U.S. naval force in the Asian Pacific region might be transferred to South
Korea, and U.S. Air Force in South Korea transformed into a regional strategic air
force.  By then, the operational control (OPCON) of the combined force will have
already been transferred to South Korea.  ROK-U.S. operational cooperation will
take a form comparable to the present U.S.-Japanese operational cooperation.
The ROK-U.S. CFC will no longer play the role of a war-fighting headquarters,
but of a joint operational coordination headquarters.  Staffing of the DMZ will be
under the sole jurisdiction of South Korean forces.  The UNC in South Korea will
be dismantled, and the present armistice will be replaced by a peace agreement
between the two Koreas. 67)
This scenario is similar to what seems to be envisaged in the KIDA-RAND study and
the present alliance review.  The only difference is that inter-Korea relations did not
improve as it was assumed in the scenario, but the United States is pushing for change
due to changes in the global security environment.
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Therefore, a much more conscious effort on both sides is necessary to work out a
suitable adjustment process and timetable for both sides.  As Cha noted in 1990, it is
“extremely difficult” to chart a future course for the alliance, and the 2010 scenario is a
“matter of conjecture.”  But, he goes on to say that “as long as such relations are valued,”
it is “imperative to analyze the present strategic environment surrounding the Korean
Peninsula and map out the ROK-US military alliance for the next century.” 68) The
redefinition continues and both sides need to engage each other for the long term and
elaborate a common vision for the future alliance in the 21st century.
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